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iv

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
U. C. A. §78-2a-3(2) (k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a subrogation action brought by State Farm Insurance
in the name of its insured, GNS Partnership.
1.

The trial court properly concluded that where the dorm

contract was silent on the issue of insurance, it was presumed that
the landlord (GNS) would provide fire insurance for the benefit of
the tenant (Fullmer) and GNS and that Fullmer was an implied coinsured for the limited purpose of subrogation.
Standard
judgment.

of

Review;

This

case

was

decided

on

summary

The trial court's conclusions of law are subject to

review for correctness.

Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 201

U. A. R. 21 (Utah 1992).
2.

The trial court ruled correctly on State Farm' s motion to

strike the affidavit of Brad Fullmer.
Standard of Review:
issues

of

law

and

fact,

The trial court' s rulings
and

are

reviewable

for

are mixed

correctness.

Maraulies bv Maraulies v. Unchurch, 696 P. 2d 1195 (Utah 1985).
3.

The trial court properly denied State Farm' s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment.

At a minimum, there were fact issues

which would have precluded summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
2

Standard of Review:

In order to rule in favor of State Farm,

the trial court would have been required to ignore the conduct of
the parties
contract.

and

rules

of

construction

applicable

to the

dorm

There was either no evidence to warrant such disregard

by the Court, or at a minimum, the parties' conduct would have
created issues of fact.

The trial court1 s conclusions of law are

subject to review for correctness.

Retherford, supra.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES M P RULES
The trial court' s judgment was entered pursuant to Rule 56,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, no statute or rule is

determinative of the issues before this court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a subrogation action commenced by State Farm in the
name of its insured against Brad Fullmer.
which gave

rise to the claim,

At the time of the fire

Brad Fullmer was a 20-year old

college student at Dixie College residing in off campus student
housing, The Wedge Apartments.
Shortly

after

Fullmer

(R. 144)

became

a

resident

in

the

student

housing, he used a charcoal grill on a balcony at the apartment.
Many hours after the grill had been used, Fullmer deposited the
ashes in a cardboard box and put them in a storage closet also on
the

balcony.

During

the

night,

approximately $70,000.00 in damage.
3

a

fire

developed

(R. 51, 52, 224, 225)

causing

The dorm contract did not require Fullmer to procure insurance
for the property.
(R. 147)

The dorm contract did not address insurance.

Fullmer expected that the landlord would procure any

necessary fire insurance on the structure.

(R. 144)

The case came before the district court on competing motions
for summary judgment.

Based upon the modern trend of cases and

public policy, Fullmer argued that he was a de facto co-insured of
the landlord for purposes of subrogation, and that State Farm was
not entitled to pursue a subrogation claim against him.
Based upon these competing motions for summary judgment, the
trial court dismissed State Farm' s claim against Brad Fullmer.

(R.

235)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In

addition

to

the

statement

of

facts

set

forth by the

appellant, the following facts were not disputed:
1.

At the time Brad Fullmer entered into the student housing

agreement with The Wedge, he was a 20-year old college student.
Brad Fullmer never understood from the agreement nor was he ever
told by the owner or its representative that he would be required
to purchase and carry property insurance insuring the structure and
improvements in which he was going to reside.
Fullmer, R. 144, 145)

4

(Affidavit of Brad

2.

The student housing agreement (R. 147) contains, among

others, the following provisions:
Rent: $335. 00 PER QUARTER.
payments! . . .

...

No monthly

3.
. . .
NO MEMBER OF OPPOSITE SEX IS
ALLOWED IN THE BEDROOM, BATHROOM OR HALL
AREAS!
While there are no "dorm" hours,
students are expected to leave and enter
quietly after the 10: 00 p. m. quiet hour. . .
9.
From time to time, it may be necessary to
move one or more tenants to another apartment
to accommodate remodeling and to achieve
maximum occupancy per unit. . . .
16. Any tenant who has been given notice to
vacate the premises by the Landlord for any
reason whatsoever shall not be entitled to a
refund of his or her deposit or rent.
Names
of all such persons shall be submitted to
Dixie College as well as to their parents. It
is the intent of the Landlord and their
managers to keep The Wedge in superior
condition.
3.

None of the tenants of The Wedge Apartments, including

Brad Fullmer, were required by GNS or by the lease to provide
insurance for damage to the apartments or their furnishings.

(R.

188).
4.

State Farm did not require that the tenants, including

Brad Fullmer, furnish or provide their own insurance for any damage
which the tenant might negligently cause to the subject property,
including its contents or structure.

5

(R. 188).

5.

State Farm's "Apartment Policy" provides in part that

(page 28):
7.

Subrogation.

(a) . . .
The insured shall do nothing
after loss to prejudice such rights.
(b) The Company shall not be bound to
pay any loss if the insured has impaired any
right or recovery for loss; however, it is
agreed that the insured may:
(1)
as respects to property
while on the premises of the insured
release others in writing from
liability for loss prior to loss,
and such release shall not affect
the right of the insured to recover
hereunder; and . . . (R. 96)
6.

Subsequent to the fire, Brad Fullmer was relocated to

another apartment by the owners.

Brad and his roommates resided

there until they were asked to leave for reasons unrelated to the
fire.

The plaintiffs made no assessment against defendant or his

roommates as a result of the fire.

(Affidavit of Brad Fullmer, R.

208).

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court properly dismissed State Farm7 s claim for

subrogation.
party.

Subrogation is not available against every negligent

Insurance

and

subrogation

management and risk allocation.

revolve

around

risk,

risk

State Farm accepted the risk of

loss in this case, and is not entitled to pass it on to the tenant,
6

Fullmer.
in

the

The modern trend of cases and commentators recognize that
absence

contrary,

of

that

an

express

agreement

in

subrogation is not available

insurance carrier against a negligent tenant.
the shoes

the

of the insured

landlord

lease

to

the

to the landlord' s
The tenant stands in

for the limited purpose

of

defeating a subrogation claim.
The modern trend of cases, including this Court' s decision in
Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, infra, are supported by
many public policy factors.

Those factors include the reasonable

expectation in a modern urban setting that the landlord' s fire
policy is for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant, the
general acceptance in the marketplace that the landlord' s policy is
for

the

benefit

recognition

that

of

both

the

rent

the

landlord

paid

by

the

and

the

tenant

tenant,
pays

for

the
the

insurance, and the impracticality of requiring a tenant to purchase
millions of dollars of fire coverage simply to be a dormitory (or
apartment) dweller.
The policy
subrogation.

at issue gave the landlord the right to waive

Subrogation in this case would result in a windfall

to State Farm,

who set its

rates

not expecting to recover in

subrogation.
2.

The

trial

court properly

excluded

portions

of

Houston' s affidavit and admitted Brad Fullmer' s affidavit.
7

David
The

portions of Mr. Houston7 s affidavit that were stricken were not
based on personal knowledge.

Based upon statements made by the

court during the course of its ruling on the motions for summary
judgment, the rulings regarding both affidavits, even if incorrect,
were harmless error.
3.
denied.

The plaintiff s motion for summary judgment was properly
Even if this

decision on Fullmer's

court should overturn the trial court' s
motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

It was Fullmer's

expectation that the landlord would provide fire insurance for his
benefit.
after

In addition, the conduct of the landlord and the tenant

the

fire

evidences

their

mutual

understanding

that

the

landlord' s insurance was for the benefit of both the landlord and
the tenant.

The landlord' s failure to require the tenant, in the

lease, to provide insurance would require the court to add terms by
implication
judgment

to

under

a contract
these

prepared

by the

circumstances

should

adversely to Fullmer.

8

landlord.
not

be

Summary
determined

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
FARM' S CLAIM FOR SUBROGATION.

STATE

It is clear that subrogation is not available against every
negligent party.

The Fashion Place Investments, Inc. v. Salt Lake

County. 776 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989); cert. den. 783 P. 2d 53 (Utah
1989), Board of Education v. Hales. 566 P. 2d 1246 (Utah 1977), and
Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane. 572 P. 2d 402 (Utah 1977)
cases each refused to allow subrogation against negligent occupants
or users of property.
Fire loss is nearly always occasioned by negligence.

The

inherent nature of insurance is that it revolves around risk, risk
management, and risk allocation.
P. 2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1977).

Board of Education v. Hales. 566

This case is not about negligence.

This case is not about proximate cause.

This case is about who

bears the risk of loss under all of the circumstances which exist.
The trial court properly allocated the loss which occurred to State
Farm.
It is "common experience" that a landlord keeps his premises
insured

against

fire loss.

Sloane.

572 P. 2d 402 at

404

Bonneville on the Hill Company v.
(Utah

1977).

In this

case, the

reasonable expectations or "common experience" of the parties i. e. - that the landlord would provide property insurance - should
9

be given great weight.
P. 2d

664 at

668

Pickover v. Smith' s Management Corp. , 771

(Utah 1989);

Fashion Place Inv.

v.

Salt Lake

County, 776 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1989).
A frequently cited case addressing subrogation claims of the
type presented in this action is Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P. 2d 478
(Okla. App. 1975).

Sutton was cited favorably by this Court in

Fashion Place, supra, at 944.
performed
apartment.

a chemistry

In Sutton, a ten year old tenant

experiment

which started

a fire in the

In the subrogation action brought against the tenant' s

parents by the landlord' s insurance company, the court discussed
the principle of subrogation as follows:
Under the facts and circumstances in this
record the subrogation should not be available
to the insurance carrier because the law
considers the tenant as a co-insured of the
landlord absent an express agreement between
them to the contrary, comparable to the
permissive
user
feature
of
automobile
insurance.
This principle is derived from a
recognition of a relational reality, namely,
that both landlord
and tenant have an
insurable interest in the rented premises the former owns the fee and the latter has the
possessory interest.
Here the landlords
(Suttons) purchased the fire insurance from
Central Mutual Insurance Company to protect
such interest in the property against loss
from fire. This is not uncommon.
And as a
matter of sound business practice the premium
paid had to be considered in establishing the
rent rate on the rental unit.
Such premium
was chargeable against the rent as an overhead
or operating expense.
And of course it
follows then that the tenant actually paid the
premium as part of the monthly rental.
10

The landlords of course could have held out
for an agreement that the tenant would furnish
fire insurance on the premises. They did not.
They elected to themselves purchase the
coverage. To suggest the fire insurance does
not extend to the insurable interest of an
occupying tenant is to ignore the realities of
urban apartment and single family dwelling
renting. Prospective tenants ordinarily rely
upon the owner of the dwelling to provide fire
protection for the realty (as distinguished
from personal property) absent an express
agreement otherwise.
Certainly it would not
likely occur to a reasonably prudent tenant
that the premises were without fire insurance
protection or if there was such protection it
did not inure to his benefit and that he would
need to take out another fire policy to
protect himself from any loss during his
occupancy.
Perhaps this comes about because
the
companies
themselves
have
accepted
coverage of a tenant as a natural thing.
Otherwise their insurance salesmen would have
long ago made such need a matter of common
knowledge by promoting the sale to tenants of
a second fire insurance policy to cover the
real estate.
Basic equity and fundamental justice upon
which the equitable doctrine of subrogation is
established requires that when fire insurance
is provided for a dwelling it protects the
insurable
interest
of
all
joint
owners
including the possessory interests of a tenant
absent an express agreement bv the latter to
the contrary.
The company affording such
coverage should not be allowed to shift the
fire loss to an occupying tenant even if the
latter negligently caused it.
New Hampshire
Insurance Co. v. Ballard Wade, Inc. , 17 Utah
2d 786, 404 P. 2d 674 (1965).
(at 482)
(Emphasis added)
The text, 6A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, §4055 (1991
Supp.), and the Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W. 2d 87 (Iowa 1992)
11

infra, case, authorities relied on by State Farm, recognize the
Sutton opinion as reflective of the "modern trend" of decisions on
the issue of residential landlord-tenant subrogation.

Sutton, and

other cases reaching similar conclusions, have articulated policy
factors which support the conclusion that the tenant should be
treated as a co-insured under the landlord' s policy absent an
express provision to the contrary.
(a)

These factors include:

It is the reasonable expectation of the parties to

the residential lease that, without an express provision to the
contrary, the landlord carries fire insurance for the benefit of
both the landlord and the tenant.

Cascade Trailer Corp. v. Beeson,

749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. App. 1988); Sutton, supra, Bonneville on the
Hill Company, supra.
(b)

It would be illogical for both the landlord and

tenant to procure separate insurance policies on the same property
interest.

The landlord has an enormously greater interest to see

that the apartments

are insured.

The Utah Supreme Court has

recognized that all fire insurance is of the "property" type, and
not the "liability" type.
(c)

Board of Educ. v. Hales, supra at 1247.

As a matter of sound business practice, the premium

paid by the landlord, GNS, for insurance had to be considered in
establishing the rental rate of the unit, and in effect was paid by
the tenant, Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P. 2d at 482, supra.
12

It would be

an "undue hardship" to require a tenant to obtain fire insurance
when he is already paying
through his rent.
(d)

for fire insurance

on the premises

Rizzuto, supra, p. 6 90 .

GNS,

in

the

dorm

contract,

could

easily

have

required that Fullmer furnish fire insurance on the premises, but
did not, Sutton, supra: Rizzuto, infra.
(e)

There is in most instances an enormous disparity in

bargaining power with respect to apartment leases, and especially
in this case involving a dorm contract with a tenant that even the
landlord recognizes was a novice.
the dorm contract, R. 148).

(See language in "Guaranty" of

The landlord could have unilaterally

required the tenant to carry insurance, but did not.

Sutton,

supra.
(f)

It would not likely occur to a reasonably prudent

tenant that the premises were without fire insurance protection, or
that it did not inure to his benefit and that he would need to take
out another fire policy,

Sutton, supra at 482; Cascade Trailer

Corp. v. Jim Beeson. et al. , 749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. 1988) rev. den.
1988.
In

Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P. 2d 688 at 691 (Wash. App. 1979).

this

case,

Fullmer

testified

that

he

would

anticipated that he needed to insure the premises.

13

never

have

(R. 144, 145).

(g)

Fire insurance companies have come to accept the

concept of tenants being co-insureds.

Rizzuto. supra, at 690.

If

not, it would be expected that they would be promoting the sale to
tenants of a second fire insurance policy to cover the real estate,
which apparently they are not.

Sutton, supra at 482.

If State

Farm did not expect to include GNS' tenants, including Fullmer, in
its policy, it should have removed from its policy the right of GNS
to release their subrogation rights.
(h)
subrogation

Even State

rights.

Farm

(See policy, R. 96, para. 7).

assumed that it would

The Apartment

Policy it issued

not have
gave the

landlord the right to release State Farm' s subrogation rights,
(Policy, p. 28 "Subrogation," R. 96)

Thus, State Farm's premiums

to the landlord were necessarily based on the assumption that State
Farm' s subrogation rights would be released.
recovery by State Farm would be a windfall.

Any

subrogation

This court can safely

assume, as the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Board of Education
of Jordan School District v. Hales, 566 P. 2d 1246 (Utah 1977), that
State Farm has, "after painstaking analysis [of losses because of
fire . . . directly traced to some act or acts of negligence] . .
. fixed its premium and issued its policy."

(at 1247), and can

further assume that this analysis "revolved around understanding
and manipulating the concept of risk management, risk control, risk
transference, risk distribution, risk retention, etc." (at 1247.)
14

State Farm has offered no evidence to suggest that the loss which
occurred was not considered in setting its rates, or that the loss
which occurred was of the type for which it expected to recover
subrogation.
(i)

Denial of a right of subrogation in cases such as

this, where there is no express provision in the lease requiring
the tenant to provide insurance, will reduce costly litigation.
Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Commun. , 623 P. 2d 1216, fn. 3 at p.
1219 (Alaska 1981).
(j)

Denial of a right to subrogation prevents windfalls

to insurers who have already assumed and been paid for the risk,
avoids the cost to society of double insuring property, and places
/here it was intended to be, on the landlord's insurance
carrier who

has

collected premiums

to

cover the loss

insured

against.
Perhaps the policy reasons for denying subrogation rights to
apar^
po~

ners' insurance companies, such as State Farm, and the
£ this litigation are best summarized in Robert Keeton' s
^ext on Insurance Law (1971) where it is stated that:
Probably it is undesirable, from the point of
view of public interest, that the risk of loss
from a fire negligently caused by a [tenant]
be
upon
the
[tenant]
rather
than
the
[landlord's]
insurer.
Allowing
the
[landlord's] insurer to proceed against the
[tenant] is surely contrary to expectations of
persons other than those who have been exposed
15

to this bit of law either during negotiations
for a lease or else after a loss.
This Court, in the Fashion Place, supra, case, cited favorably
to Sutton and many of the other cases which reflect the "modern
trend, " i.e. , that in the absence of language to the contrary in
the

lease,

it

is

expected

that

the

owner

will

procure

fire

insurance for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant.
In Fashion Place Investments, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, supra.
Salt Lake County

leased

space

from Fashion Place,

The lease

required the tenant to deliver up the premises at the end of the
term in good condition, . . . "damage by fire and casualty not the
fault of [Salt Lake County] . . . excepted therefrom."
(Emphasis added)

(at 943)

The landlord was required by the lease to provide

fire insurance on the building, which it did, but did not include
the County as an "insured".

The fire which resulted in the loss

was caused by the negligence of county employees, and was the
"fault" of Salt Lake County.

Thus, in Fashion Place, this Court

was faced with a subrogation action where the tenant and landlord
had expressly agreed that the tenant would bear the loss resulting
from the fire.
If,

as State

Farm incorrectly

asks this Court to assume,

negligence or liability of the tenant is the controlling factor in
a subrogation action, the Fashion Place case should have been
decided against the tenant.

Especially where the County
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(the

tenant) had agreed in the lease to be liable for fires it caused.
But

the

result

of

the

Fashion

Place

action

was

against

the

insurance company - this Court held that the insurer (Safeco) could
not recover in subrogation against the County.
An immaterial factual difference exists between the Fashion
Place case and this action in that the lease in Fashion Place
required the landlord to provide insurance.

The lease in this case

is silent as to who will provide insurance.

This difference is

immaterial, because as the Utah court recognized in Bonneville, and
has been recognized in many other jurisdictions, Sutton, supra, in
the absence of a contrary provision there is a presumed term in the
lease that the landlord will provide insurance.

Thus, in Fashion

Place, the parties had simply placed in writing that which would
have otherwise been presumed.

This Court in Fashion Place found

that where the landlord procured property insurance the tenant was
a de facto coinsured, and held that "Safeco has no right to pursue
a subrogation claim against [the tenant]."

(at 945).

By the same

analysis, Brad Fullmer was a de facto coinsured of State Farm.
An analysis

of the

various

cases

on the issue

liability reveals an apparent line of demarcation.

of tenant

This line is

determined by whether:
(a)

the jurisdiction (Utah included) adopts the premise

that when the landlord purchases
17

fire insurance it is for the

benefit of both the tenant and the landlord unless there is an
express agreement to the contrary,

(see Sutton, supra, and the

discussion in Fashion Place Investment, supra, at 944 embracing
Sutton and Rizzuto, infra); or
(b)

whether the state applies the rule that where the

agreement is silent as to who will carry the insurance, each party
is responsible to do so.

See for example Accruisto v. Hahn, 619

P. 2d 1237 (N. M. 1980) (a case relied on by State Farm at the trial
level which has been overruled in C. R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall
Partners. 817 P. 2d 238 at 243 (N. M. 1991)) and Pace v. Scott, 567
S. W. 2d 101 (Ark. 1978).
This Court has specifically embraced the Sutton and Rizzuto
rationale in Fashion Place.

The Utah Supreme Court has rejected

the reasoning of cases contrary to Sutton.

(See, for example,

Board of Educ. v. Hales, 566 P . 2d 1246 at 1247, and its agreement
with the dissent in McBroome-Bennett Plbg. v. Villa France, 515
S. W. 2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).)
State Farm contends that Utah law allows subrogation against
tenants except in three specific circumstances, relying upon Board
of Education of Jordan School District v. Hales, 566 P. 2d 1246
(Utah

1977);

and

Fashion

Place Investment,

Inc.

v.

Salt

Lake

County. 776 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989); and Bonneville on the Hill
Co.

v.

Sloane.

572

P. 2d

402

(Utah
18

1977)

to

identify

those

circumstances.

In each of those cases, subrogation was denied

against a negligent defendant.

However, none of the cases suggest

that instances in which subrogation will be disallowed are limited
to those particular circumstances .
State Farm places considerable reliance upon a recent Iowa
decision, Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N. W. 2d 87 (Iowa 1992), which
specifically

rejects

this

court's

decision

in

Fashion

Place.

Neubauer relies extensively on a quote from the Appleman treatise
which discusses the right of the insurer to decide who it will
insure.

This factor relied on in Neubauer is not applicable to

State Farm7 s policy in this case, because State Farm gave its
insured the right to waive State Farm' s subrogation rights.

Thus,

it was not State Farm who was to decide who it would insure.

State

Farm

passed

that

right

to

GNS.

GNS

gave

away

State

Farm' s

subrogation right when it failed to require Fullmer to provide his
own insurance.

The result in the Fashion Place case also rejects

Neubauer7 s reasoning.
insured.

In Fashion Place, County was not a named co-

The insurer in Fashion Place did not "decide" to insure

Salt Lake County.

Salt Lake County, like Fullmer, was a " de facto

co-insured. "
Neubauer

rejects without

elaboration the extensive

discussion in Sutton that in modern urban circumstances

policy
it is

presumed, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary,
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that the landlord will provide insurance on the premises for the
benefit of both the landlord and tenant.

Sutton recognizes the

disparate bargaining power between landlords

and tenants.

The

thinness of Neubauer' s reasoning is reflected in the statement
that:

"If the landlord had agreed to insure the tenant's interest

in the property and failed to do so, the result might be different
(p.

90)."

Thus,

even Neubauer turns upon the issue of whose

obligation it is to provide fire insurance.
Contrary to the Iowa case, in Utah there is a presumption in
all leases, based on "common experience," that the landlord keeps
the premises insured against fire loss.
C£h, supra, 572 P. 2d at 403-404.)

(Bonneville on the Hill

As articulated in the Sutton,

supra, case, a tenant is entitled to assume that the landlord' s
insurance is for his benefit, unless stated otherwise in the lease.
The presumption that insurance purchased by GNS was for the
benefit of the tenant, unless expressly agreed otherwise, should be
given even more emphasis in this particular case.

The rental

agreement at issue (R. 147, 148), while loosely referred to as a
lease, is in reality a dorm contract.

The dorm contract contains

a provision for the parent' s guaranty (which was not signed in this
case).

The guaranty recognizes that the agreement may be the

student's "first experience with tenant/landlord relationships."
The dorm contract called for quarterly and not monthly rental.
20

/

The

rooms

were

furnished

and

the tenant's

conduct

was

subject to

restrictive limitations which would not ordinarily be found in
rental agreements.

Paragraph 6 of the agreement indicates that no

refunds of deposits will be made to tenants who have breached the
rules and regulations.
Fullmer from

The landlord even had the right to move

unit to unit - much like a hotel guest.

In spite of

all of these rules, and the disparate bargaining power, there is
nothing in the dorm contract to suggest that the landlord would not
be insuring the property for the benefit of all involved, or that
the tenant should obtain separate fire insurance.
The denial of subrogation to State Farm is consistent with
prior Utah decisions, and consistent with the "modern trend" of
cases.

Sutton v. Jondahl, supra.

Cascade Trailer Court v. Beeson,

749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. App. 1988); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Weiscrerber,
767 P. 2d 271 (Idaho 1989); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, 705 P. 2d
659 (Nev. 1985); Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P. 2d 688 (1979); Alaska
Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaskan Communications, Inc. , 623 P. 2d 1216
(Alaska 1981); Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P. 2d 944
(Utah App. 1989), cert. den. 783 P. 2d 53 (Utah 1989); Continental
Insurance

v.

Bottomly,

817

P. 2d

1162

(Mont.

1991);

Fireman7 s

Insurance Co. v. Wheeler. 566 N. Y. S. 2d 692 (1991); Keeton. Basic
Text on Insurance Law, §4. 4b (1971).
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In Cascade Trailer Corp. v. Beeson, 749 P. 2d 761 (Wash. App.
1988) three men rented a dwelling unit from Cascade.
started

by

one

of the

tenants

unattended on an electric stove.

when he left

A fire was

a pan

of

grease

The lease required the tenants to

redeliver the premises in good condition.

The owner' s insurance

company paid the loss and brought a subrogation action against the
tenant.
whether

The issue presented
the

tenants

".

.

.

for resolution by the court was
[were] implied

co-insureds

under

Cascade' s fire insurance policy, thus defeating the insured' s right
of subrogation against them?"

(at 762)

The Washington Appellate

Court analyzed many of the cases which have addressed the issue,
including the public policy issues which they presented and ruled
in favor of the tenant stating (at 766):
Whether rent covers all of the landlord' s
expenses,
including
insurance
premiums
[referring to Sutton] is not the critical
question.
Rather, the issue concerns the
party' s reasonable expectations.
Where the
landlord has secured fire insurance covering
the leased premises, the tenant can reasonably
expect the insurance to cover him as well,
unless the parties have specifically agreed
otherwise.
Why? - because the tenant is in
privity of contract with the landlord, and he
has a property interest in the premises the
insurance protects.
The court concluded:
We adopt the reasonable expectations rationale
of the Sutton line of cases and hold Cascade
is presumed to carry its insurance for the
22

tenant
lefit because the lease did not
contain _i express provision to the contrary.
(a.
A& _s true in this case, there was no requirement in the
rental agreement in Cascade that required either the landlord or
the tenant to provide insurance.
In Safeco Insurance Companies v. Weisaerber,
iho

1989),

Safeco

brought

a subrogation

767 P. 2d 271

action

to

recover

^mounts which it had paid on account of a fire caused by the
negligence of a tenant in a rental home.

On competing motions for

summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of the tenant.
The tenant testified that he did not obtain fire insurance on the
real property because the landlord never requested that he do so
and he did not feel it was his responsibility.

The Idaho Court

rejected _ .e notion that the tenant should be liable and stated:
denial of a right to subrogation in this
instance prevents windfalls
to insurers,
prevents the double-insuring of property and
places r.-.e risk where it was intended to be,
on the landlord1 s insurance carrier which has
collected premiums to cover the loss insured
against. " (at 274)
In Safeco Insurance Company v. Capri, 705 P. 2d 659 (Nev. 1985)
Safeco brought an action against a tenant who negligently caused a
fire that burned down a rental property.

The Nevada Supreme Court

relied

discussed

on

many

of

the

cases

already

following separate observations:
23

and

made

the

It is not uncommon for the lessor to provide
fire insurance on the leased property.
As a
matter of sound business practice, the premium
to
be
paid
had
to
be
considered
in
establishing the rental rate. (661) . . .
Moreover, insurance companies expect to pay
their insureds for negligently caused fires
and adjust their rates accordingly.
In this
context, an insurer should not be allowed to
treat a tenant, who is in privity with the
insured landlord, as a negligent third party
when it could not collect against its own
insured had the insured negligently caused the
fire.
(661)
The Rizzuto
fRizzuto v. Morris, 592 P.2d 688
(Wash. Ap. 1979)] court concluded that if the
[landlord] did not expect to cover the
[tenant] under the policy, then they should
have expressly notified the [tenant] of the
need for a second policy to cover its
interest.
"Since they failed to do so, they
have no cause of action against the lessee for
the fire damage, and the insurance company has
no right of subrogation."
(661)
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Bottomlv. 817 P. 2d 1162 (Mont.
1991) the Montana Supreme Court adopted the rationale in Sutton and
refused a subrogation claim arising out of a cabin fire.

The fire

was caused by the owner' s brother who was a regular user, but not
an owner, of the cabin.
upon the discussion

from

The Montana court focused particularly
Sutton that

"subrogation is a fluid

concept depending upon the particular facts and circumstances of a
given case for its applicability.
adhere - to others it will not. "
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To some facts subrogation will

In Iowa National Insurance v. Boatricrht, 516 P. 2d 439 (Colo.
1973) the court rejected a subrogation claim against a father who
negligently started a fire in his daughter' s home.
State Farm attempts to argue that reasonable expectations of
the parties to the lease should play no role in the outcome of this
litigation.

(State

Farm

Memorandum,

p.

25).

The

Allen v.

Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance. 839 P. 2d 798 (Utah 1992)
case relied upon by State Farm addresses the issue of "reasonable
expectations" in a very limited context where the express language
in the insurance contract was contrary to what the insured claimed
were her "reasonable expectations".
silent on the issue of insurance.

In this case, the lease is
The Allen case has no factual

relationship to this case.
The law generally is that a contract includes those items
which

were

understood

by

or

circumstances of the agreement.

obvious

to

the

parties

in

the

This is especially true in this

case where the contract is not integrated, and is silent on the
issue of insurance.

17 A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts

§379.

Fullmei

testified that he did not understand he could have been required tc
obtain separate insurance, to insure the structure, and that h€
would have expected the owner to have his own insurance.
156).

The

expectation.

owner

did

not

testify

that

he

had

any

(R. 144,
different

Under these circumstances, an implied term of the
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lease was that the landlord would provide fire insurance for the
benefit of the tenant and the landlord.
This court should also consider the interpretation of the
lease given to it by the parties.
501 P. 2d 266 (Ut. 1972).
this case.

It is not the landlord that is pressing

It is the insurer.

because of the fire.

Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz,

The landlord did not evict Fullmer

The landlord did not attempt to recover any

damages from Fullmer or his roommates based upon any language in
the lease.

No assessment was made by the landlord.

It is clear

from both the landlord and the tenant' s conduct that they expected
the landlord' s insurer to repair the property in exchange for the
premiums it had received.

The conduct of both the landlord and

tenant clearly evidences an understanding by them that the landlord
was providing

fire insurance

on the property

for their mutual

benefit.
State Farm has attempted on several occasions in their brief
(pages 24 and 22) to interject facts about whether or not Fullmer
has coverage through his parents' homeowners policy.

The only

possible reason for State Farm to include this discussion is to
affect the court' s decision on the issue of liability.

Rule 411 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence would expressly exclude this type of
evidence at trial.

This discussion should not be considered by

this court on the issue of liability.
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Even if it is considered,

there

is

no

evidence

to

support

the

conclusion

that

even if

Fullmer7 s parents had insurance, that it would cover the loss at
issue, or what the limit of Fullmer' s parents' policy was.
State Farm' s argument raises a more disturbing public policy
factor.

The policy issued by State Farm insured the premises for

$1. 5 million.

(R. 229)

Even if Fullmer was required to obtain a

tenant' s policy, the policy would have had to have insured Fullmer
for $1. 5 million if it were to protect him from fire loss to the
property.

(The whole project could have burned. )

And what about

the family that has two children at college, each living in a large
dormitory or apartment complex worth tens of millions of dollars.
If State Farm' s argument is adopted, that family would have to
procure liability insurance with a face value of tens of millions
of dollars.

While insurance companies would no doubt enjoy the

premium income from such policies, as a matter of public policy, it
is

far

more

dormitory

reasonable

property

to

for

the

include

insurer

the

of

conduct

the
of

apartment

tenants

in

or
its

evaluation of risks and in establishing premiums, thus placing the
cost of insuring the risk upon the landlord, who then is in a
position to pass it on to the tenant in a pro rata manner.
In any event, State Farm's attempt to interject this issue
ignores the fact that it was the landlord' s obligation to provide
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fire insurance for the benefit of both parties, absent express
language in the lease to the contrary.
The case of U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty v. Let1 s Frame It, 75 9
P. 2d 819

(Colo. App.

1988) (page 14 of State Farm's brief) is

distinguishable on several bases.

The most important of these is

the specific requirement in the lease that the tenant maintain
insurance,

thus

negating

any

implication

that

the

landlord' s

insurance was for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant.
On numerous occasions through its brief, State Farm misstates
Sutton' s holding as being that "a tenant is a co-insured simply
because he is a tenant."

(Page 21)

Sutton' s holding is actually

much narrower, to wit, "that in the absence of an express agreement
between [the landlord and tenant] to the contrary • . . ". (532 P. 2d
at 482) the tenant is an implied co-insured.

State Farm then

argues that as a practical matter the chances that such language
would be included in the lease are "almost nill".
ignores reality.

This contention

It is the landlord that prepares the lease and

can place the language in the lease.

It is the insurance company

that can require the landlord to put the language in the lease.
The insurance company can do this by eliminating the exceptions to
subrogation in the policies.

This court must assume that there is

some competitive advantage to State Farm to issue policies which
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allow landlords to waive subrogation rights and which do not force
landlords to require tenants to obtain their own insurance.
Public policy should require that a tenant be affirmatively
placed on notice in the lease of the need to obtain fire insurance
to overcome the

"reasonable

expectation"

that the landlord is

obtaining insurance for their mutual benefit.

In the absence of

such notice or requirement in the lease, subrogation should be
denied.
State Farm argues that to not find Fullmer ultimately liable
in this case turns traditional tort law upside down.

(Page 21)

Indeed, insurance does, to a large extent, turn tort law upside
down.

Insurance protects people against negligence, even their own

negligence.

Insurance

is

a

device

used

to

allocate

risk.

Insurance is a device which allows parties to plan their affairs.
Subrogation is but a narrow aspect of insurance.
variation

in the

cases

which

have applied

and

The wide factual
adopted

Sutton

emphasize the critical role that policy factors and the expectation
of the parties have played in the determination of subrogation
rights.
At the outset of this brief, Fullmer observed that this case
is not about negligence or proximate cause, but is about allocation
of risk.

The district court' s decision places the risk in this

case exactly where it belongs, upon the insurance company that
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established

and accepted premiums, which were determined

after

consideration of all risks and in light of the landlord' s right to
give up the company' s subrogation rights, to insure the premises
against fire, and not on a 20-year old dorm resident.

The district

court' s decision places the burden upon the landlord, who is in the
position to expressly require the tenant in the lease to obtain
insurance

if the tenant was

expected to do so.

The district

court' s decision advances what Robert Keeton, supra, and the modern
trend of cases calls the "reasonable expectations" of the parties.
II
THE TRIAL COURT RULED PROPERLY WITH RESPECT TO
THE AFFIDAVITS OF BRAD FULLMER AND DAVID
HOUSTON.
(a)

David Houston Affidavit.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure provides that "supporting or opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. "
In addition, they must set forth "specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial."
Mr. Houston's affidavit (R. 217) states that he was a claims
superintendent for State Farm for five years.

The affidavit goes

on to make additional statements, some of which were stricken by
the

trial

court.

In particular,
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the trial

court

struck Mr.

Houston' s testimony in paragraph 5 and 6 discussing his belief
regarding homeowner' s policies coverage and children living away
from home and tenant policies.
The trial court' s ruling striking those paragraphs was correct
for several
knowledge

reasons-

regarding

Houston does not set forth any personal
the

Prudential

policy

which

the

stricken

paragraphs purport to address or the extent of its coverage.

The

affidavit does not provide any foundation to support a conclusion
that Houston has any knowledge of policies issued by any company
other than State Farm.

The affidavit does not state that Houston

has any background in underwriting, or any experience except in
claims.

Houston' s affidavit is not responsive to the issue of the

reasonable expectation of the parties to the rental agreement.
Houston' s

affidavit

does

not

available in a tenant policy.

address

the

limits

of

Mr.

coverage

Mr. Houston' s affidavit does not

address State Farm' s underwriting practices, the factors State Farm
considered in setting the premium for the apartments, and most
curiously, whether or not State Farm expected that subrogation
would be available at the time it wrote the policy and set its
rates.

The affidavit is not responsive to the proposition that in

modern urban dwelling, it is presumed that the apartment owner will
procure insurance for the benefit of both the owner and the tenant.
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In summary, the stricken portions of the affidavit were not
based on personal knowledge and were not relevant to the issues
before the court.
State Farm has the burden to show that, in addition to the
trial court's ruling being in error, that there is a "reasonable
likelihood" that if the ruling had been otherwise there would have
been a different result.

Redevelopment Aacv. v. Mitsui Inv. . Inc. ,

522 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1974).
For
paragraphs

all

of

these

reasons,

the

court' s

ruling

striking

5 and

6 was

correct because the affidavit was

not

relevant to any issue regarding liability and was not based on
personal knowledge.

If the court erred, it was in allowing any

part of the affidavit to be received.
harmless error.
(b)

At a minimum, any error was

Rule 61, U. R. C. P.

Fullmer Affidavit.

State Farm argues that Fullmer' s

Affidavit was based on hindsight, and as such, must be stricken.
Initially, the trial court stated that the affidavit did not affect
its decision.
harmless error.
Rule

Therefore, any error in the trial court' s ruling is
Rule 61, U. R. C. P.

401, Utah Rules

of Evidence, provides

that

relevant

evidence means evidence having a tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more

probable

or

less

probable
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than it would

be without

the

evidence.

It is not disputed in this action that insurance was not

discussed

at the time the lease was entered into and was not

covered in the lease.
have expected

(R.

Fullmer' s statements about what he would

144,

145) are relevant to the issue of the

reasonable expectation of the parties.

As discussed previously,

the reasonable expectations of parties to a contract, as well as
their

conduct in relation to the contract,

are

factors

to be

considered in construing obligations arising under the contract.
In

the

context

of

plaintiff s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

Fullmer' s Affidavit was probative of the issue of whether or not
there was an implied agreement that the landlord would provide
insurance on the property for the type of loss which occurred.

Any

contrary conclusion by the trial court would have required that
court to ignore both the "general understanding in modern urban
settings that the landlord provides property coverage" (Sutton) and
Fullmer' s understanding.
Fullmer' s testimony may also be viewed as opinion testimony by
a

lay witness.

rationally

based

Mr.

Fullmer was

on his

a renter.

perception

of the

The testimony is
obligations

of the

landlord and tenant and is helpful to the determination of a fact
in

issue,

to wit,

the

obligation

of the

landlord

to

provide

insurance coverage for the benefit of both the landlord and the
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tenant in the absence of an express contractual provision to the
contrary.
The Webster v.

Sill.

675 P. 2d

1170

relied on by State Farm is inapposite.

(Utah

1983) decision

Webster dealt with a

situation where an affiant attempted to contradict his earlier
deposition testimony.

Allen v. Prudential

Property & Casualty

Insurance Co. , 839 P. 2d 798 (Utah 1992) is also inapposite.

In

Allen, the reasonable expectation doctrine was rejected because the
insurance agreement contained express language contrary to what the
insured claimed was her reasonable expectation.

In this case, the

lease was silent on the issue of insurance.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the "reasonable
expectations

doctrine

is

one

in

equity

misapplying existing equitable doctrines. "

to

protect

against

Allen, supra, p. 806.

The application of the "reasonable expectations doctrine" to this
subrogation action is appropriate.
For all of these reasons, Fullmer7 s affidavit was properly
received.
Ill
PLAINTIFF' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
PROPERLY DENIED.
It is Fullmer' s position that pursuant to
a)

an assumption based on common experience (Bonneville

on the Hill, supra, at 404), and
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b)
Rizzuto,

the rule of construction approved of in Sutton and

supra,

(and embraced

in Fashion

Place),

that

in the

absence of a writing to the contrary, the landlord is obligated to
provide fire insurance on the property for the benefit of both the
landlord and the tenant.
State Farm' s motion was based upon the premise that there was
no factual issue about who was to provide fire insurance.
agreed

—

there

was

no

factual

issue

that

the

Fullmer

landlord

was

obligated to provide insurance for the benefit of both.
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm asked the court
to determine as a matter of law that Fullmer was not covered by the
landlord' s fire insurance.
court

would

have

had

to

To rule in favor of State Farm, the
ignore

the

"reasonable

expectations"

(including Fullmer' s affidavit) or the assumption based on common
experience that the landlord' s fire policy covered fire loss caused
by Fullmer.

The conduct of the parties before and after the fire,

as discussed previously at p. 25-26, at a minimum, creates issues
which preclude summary judgment against Fullmer.

Fashion Place

Inv. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, supra.
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm was asking the
court to imply a term in the dorm contract requiring Fullmer to
provide fire insurance.

The landlord drafted the lease and it

should be construed against the landlord.
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Neither this court nor

the trial court should not be adding implied terms to the lease
favorable to the drafter in summary judgment proceedings.

Amoco

Production v. Lindlev. 609 P. 2d 733 at 745 (Okla. 1980).
Fullmer' s

affidavit,

the

reasonable

expectation

of

the

parties, the conduct of the parties, and the absence of language in
the lease would have to be considered in a light most favorable to
Fullmer, and at a minimum, would create issues of fact precluding
summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
State Farm' s motion asserted that the landlords could have
reasonably expected that the homeowner' s insurance on Fullmer' s
parents' permanent residence would provide liability coverage for
fire damage caused by Fullmer' s negligence.

The landlords never

stated this by affidavit or otherwise and there is no factual basis
to support this position.

In fact, the landlords did not require

insurance or evidence of insurance by the tenant as a condition of
occupancy.
State

Farm' s assertion,

through Houston' s affidavit,

that

State Farm understood Fullmer had liability coverage through a
separate homeowner' s policy, as discussed previously, is directly
contrary to Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and should not
be considered by the court in determining liability.
Hreinson, 409 P. 2d 121

(Utah 1965).

Robinson v.

Furthermore, State Farm's

understanding after the fact has nothing to do with the reasonable
36

expectations of the parties (GNS and Fullmer) at the time the lease
was signed.
For these reasons, summary judgment in favor of State Farm was
properly refused,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the
judgment of the district court dismissing the Complaint.
DATED this

day of March, 1993.

Keith W. Me&de
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